Main Pic :: Damage sustained by the US "COLE" at a port at Yemen in 1990
Al-Qaeda and ISIS
: Different World, different strategies and different vision These two- the AL-QUAEDA and the ISIS are TWO different entities and two different organization which has creeped into the world to cause PANIC and DESTRUCTION to the MANKIND and HUMANITIES
It was way back in 1989 when the USSR was fighting at Afghanistan against the radical group and once it took out itself in it’s fight the Al-Quaeda for something best known to them regrouped itself to get into the entanglement with the United states of America.
It’s BELIEF and it’s theory was based on the fact that the Americans are and were out to FDEMOLISH and completely DESTRUCT the Islams and they somehow came forward with the plans and the thinking that the Al-Quaeda was the one which would be the SAVIOURS of Islam . Their battle with the American started and the HIT-OF-PENTAGON was the FIRST of it’s kind to SMASH and HIT the Americans targeting the Christian community with the aim to completely wipe out the Christians from the world.
The Islamic State’s influence and model are spreading. Even in many Muslim countries where the Islamic State does not have a strong presence, its rise is radicalizing their populations, fomenting sectarianism, and making a troubled region worse.
America initially was adopting a WAIT-AND-A-WATCH policy but no sooner that it saw that the attack
and the launches on it at places was becoming more and more the the hostilities
were increasing MORE it took on the
other route and it deployed it’s military to counter the radical Islamic group
which was everytime either hitting the Americans or brutalizing the Christians
where it had to do with America.
My Readings :: My Testimony :: COMPARISM BETWEEN Al-QUEDA AND ISIS
My testimony today will focus on comparing Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Many would agree with me. A lot of them will say- I’M CORRECT. However the comparism will draw out a better illusion and it’s appreciative prologues about what I tend to compare these two ANTI-HUMAN-RADICAL-GROUP. I argue that Al Qaeda and its affiliates remain a threat to the U.S. homeland, while the Islamic State’s danger is more to the stability of the Middle East and U.S. interests overseas.
LONE WOLF : HOWEVER NON-IMPELLENT AND VOCIFEROUS IN SOME AREAS The Islamis state believes in the theory that it can and it is the ONLY source available and the only hope that remains to completely safeguard the Islam and it’s existernce in the world. Much of their rivalry involves a competition for affiliates, with both trying to spread their model and in Al Qaeda’s case to ensure its operational relevance. After Iraq, Syria and Libya have been completely send to the muds in terms of mince, the radical ISIS has started concentrating on these three nation surfing the belief and passing on a message that these are the MESSIAH of ISLAM which has come to save them from a completely - disaster For now the Islamic State’s focus is primarily on Iraq and Syria and to a lesser degree on other states in the Muslim world, particularly Libya. In the United States and in Europe it may inspire “lone wolves,” but it is not directing its resources to attack in these areas, and security services are prepared for the threat. Al Qaeda is weaker and less dynamic than the Islamic State, but the former remains more focused on attacking the United States and its Western allies.
My testimony is organized into four sections. Some readings and more informations have been collected and studies by me as I put my observations in the paras here but my readings are based on certain conclusion that I had arrived and forming an opinion about them in my studies so far before jotting the lines here. I first offer some general background on the origins of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. I then discuss the threat profiles for each group, assessing both their strategies and tactics. The third section looks at the struggle to win over affiliate groups in the Muslim world. I conclude my testimony by discussing the policy implications and recommendations for the United States, and I CONCLUDE by saying that th AMERICANS will BADLY need INDIA, RUSSIA, FRANCE,GERMANy and GREAT BRITAIN if at all this menance of ILL-HUMAN-DESTRUCTION has to be weeded out of the world.However it is AMERICA that has to take the LEAD to FIGHT this menance and that is a TRUTH like the SUN RISING FROM THE EAST..
The DIVERSE origin of Al-Queda and ISIS Group
Al Qaeda emerged out of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. As the Soviets prepared to withdraw, Osama Bin Laden and a few of his close associates—high on their perceived victory over the mighty Soviet Union—decided to capitalize on the network they had built to take jihad global. Bin Laden’s vision was to create a vanguard of elite fighters who could lead the global jihad project and bring together the hundreds of small jihadist groups struggling, often feebly, against their own regimes under a single umbrella.
By the mid-1990s, he wanted to reorient the movement as a whole, focusing it on what he saw as the bigger enemy underwriting all these corrupt local regimes: the United States. For local jihadists, pledging allegiance to Bin Laden and adopting the Al Qaeda brand meant obtaining access to a wide range of assets: money, weapons, logistical support, expertise, and, of course, training—Al Qaeda training camps were the Ivy Leagues of jihadist education.
Building A Brand : : A House Hold Name By attacking America and Americans
Small and petty attack were by and large done on the American entities and the bodies at Africa, and East African continents and at times the American Consulates at place were attacked either to cause a alarm or to cause a heavy casualtis. The 1998 attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa, and of course 9/11, made Al Qaeda’s brand a household name. The attacks demonstrated the power, capabilities, reach, and sheer audacity of the organization. But although the 9/11 attacks electrified the global jihadist movement and raised Al Qaeda’s profile on the global stage, the U.S. counterterrorism response that followed was devastating to both Al Qaeda and the broader movement it purported to lead.
The US is ONE country that DOES-NOT-WAIT to respond alike and like the Indians and India when it comes to safeguards it’s people and it’s SOVERIGNITY . It palns and attacks in a very ruthless manner and it’s principle always has been- BREAK THE ENEMY NOT BY IT’S COLLAR BONE BUT BY IT’S BACKBONE. Over the next decade, the U.S. relentlessly pursued Al Qaeda, targeting its leadership, disrupting its finances, destroying its training camps, infiltrating its communications networks, and ultimately crippling its ability to function. It remained a symbol of the global jihadist movement, but its inability to successfully launch another major attack against the United States meant that symbol was becoming less powerful. The death of the charismatic Bin Laden and the ascension of the much less compelling Ayman al-Zawahiri to the top leadership position further diminished the power of the Al Qaeda brand.
POLIFERATION OF THE JEHADI GROUP IN IRAQ
The complete demolition of Iraq and the end of the Iraqui leader Saddam Hussain and the complete liquidity of Saddam’s family saw the complete end of everything that Iraq could boast thereafter.The Islamic State began as an Iraqi organization, and this legacy shapes the movement today. After Iraq had NOTHING to withstand and counter for it’s survival, totally depending upon the US ALMS and the help by the World bank and IMF, the rogue elements slowly started entering Iraq saying them that they werwe their SAVIOURS and the MASSANGERS against the Christian group led by the US. Jihadist groups proliferated in Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion, and many eventually coalesced around Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian jihadist who spent time in Afghanistan in the 1990s and again in 2001. Though Bin Laden gave Zarqawi seed money to start his organization, Zarqawi at first refused to swear loyalty to and join Al Qaeda, as he shared only some of Bin Laden’s goals and wanted to remain independent. After months of negotiations, however, Zarqawi pledged his loyalty, and in 2004 his group took on the name “Al Qaeda in Iraq” to signify this connection. Bin Laden got an affiliate in the most important theater of jihad at a time when the Al Qaeda core was on the ropes, and Zarqawi got Al Qaeda’s prestige and contacts to bolster his legitimacy.
Two DIFFERENT minds with TWO DIFFERENT wishful thinking always DOES NOT makes ONE-PLUS-ONE-EQUAL-TO-TWO.There were always the difference of opinions between the two leaders of the Al-Quaeda then and there were mostly ANTI-PODES. Consequently and obviously then, even in its early days the group bickered with the Al Qaeda leadership. Zawahiri and Bin Laden pushed for a focus on U.S. targets while Zarqawi (and those who took his place after his death in 2006 from a U.S. air strike) emphasized sectarian war and attacks on Sunni Muslims deemed apostates, such as those who collaborated with the Shi’a-led regime. Zarqawi and his followers also acted with incredible brutality, making their name with gruesome beheading videos—a tactic that its successor organizations would also use to shock and generate publicity. More and more pressures and more kind of a PALMING THE GREASE in terms of benefits then came to Iraq to counter the US and it’s Army based at Iraq to send a wave of SHOCK to the US but Iraq unlike Afghanistan was NOT to BEND under and WILT under any pressure to do so, and hence the repercussion was a bit low much to the dismay of the two names Al-Quaeda leaders that I have named here. Zarqawi also kept his focus on Iraq and its immediate environs. Despite the fears of U.S. and European security officials, Iraq did not prove an Afghanistan-like incubator for attacks on the U.S. homeland and the West.
Al Qaeda in Iraq’s indiscriminate violence—including against its fellow Sunnis—eventually led to a backlash from the Sunni tribes that, when combined with the 2006 U.S. troop “surge” in Iraq, hit the group hard. For Al Qaeda, this was a broader disaster, with the Iraqi group’s setbacks and abuses tarnishing the overall jihadist cause. Indeed, in private, Al Qaeda spokesman Adam Gadahn recommended to Bin Laden that Al Qaeda publicly “sever its ties” with Al Qaeda in Iraq because of the group’s sectarian violence.
When the Syria conflict broke out in 2011 and electrified the Muslim world, Zawahiri urged Iraqi jihadists to take part in the conflict, and Baghdadi—who had taken over leadership of the Iraqi group in 2010—initially sent small numbers of fighters into Syria to build an organization. Syria was in chaos, and the Iraqi jihadists established secure bases of operations there, raising money and winning new recruits to their cause. When the US Army once for all left the shores of Syria in 2011their ambitions grew along with their organization, expanding to include Syria as well as Iraq. Iraqi jihadists, by 2013 calling themselves the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or ISIL) to reflect their new, broader orientation, also faced less pressure in Iraq with the departure of U.S. forces at the end of 2011.. At the same time, Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki put in place a series of disastrous policies to bolster support among his Shia’s base, systematically excluding Iraqi Sunnis from power. Thus Baghdadi’s organization steadily shored up popular support, regained its legitimacy in Iraq, built a base in Syria, and replenished its ranks.
In June 2014, Baghdadi’s forces shocked just about everyone when they swept across Iraq, capturing not only large parts of Iraq’s remote areas but also major cities like Mosul and Tikrit, important resources like hydroelectric dams and oil refineries, and several strategic border crossings with Syria. Bagdadi by now was becoming a constant source of SCROUGE for the US and it was he who was giving sleepless night to the US. After the assasinantion of Bin Laden, Osama as well know him, it was Baghdadi who completely took over the leadership and he started spilling the rots and the ruins by mercilessly killing and tormenting the one’s who were opposed to join his army at Iraq and Syria and on the other hand killing the Christians by bombing the places like the Churches and the embassies where the Christians would work in plenty.Almost overnight, Baghdadi went from being an annoying thorn in Zawahiri’s side to a serious challenger to his authority and a threat to his organization’s position as the vanguard of the global jihadist movement. Thousands more foreign fighters, inspired by the stunning success of the Islamic State and the bold declaration of a caliphate, flocked to Syria and Iraq to join the fight.
Profile of Threat : Different and ANTI – US BEING THE CONCERN
The dispute between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda is more than just a fight for power within the jihadist movement. The two organizations differ on the main enemies, strategies, tactics, and other fundamental concerns. As a result, the threat they pose to the United States differs as well.
Although the ultimate goal of Al Qaeda is to overthrow the corrupt “apostate” regimes in the Middle East and replace them with “true” Islamic governments, Al Qaeda’s primary enemy is the United States, which it sees as the root cause of the Middle East’s problems. By targeting the United States, Al Qaeda believes it will eventually induce the United States to end support for these Muslim state regimes and withdraw from the region altogether, thus leaving the regimes vulnerable to attack from within. Al Qaeda considers Shi’a Muslims to be apostates but sees their killing to be too extreme, a waste of resources, and detrimental to the broader jihadist project.
Ostensibly in response to intervention by the United States and others in the conflict, Western civilians in the region (including journalists and humanitarian aid workers) have also become targets—though the Islamic State saw them as hostile before the U.S. intervention. And now that American military advisers are on the ground in Iraq supporting the Iraqi military, the U.S. military has ostensibly become a primary target for the Islamic State, but the lack of troops within range diminishes this danger.
US is there with all the BEST of the weapons, the ammunitions, the arms and the military which is so STRONG that within NO-TIME and within a FLICK of the FINGER it can completely WIPE-OFF the unwanted and the THREE nation that we call them as Libya, Syria and Iraq.However for the want of the HUMAN RACE to exist it is taking a different route to stabilize the PEACE and the HUMANS of these three countries thereby allowing the COMMUNITY to get a chance to LIVE and DEVELOP.
Al-Quaeda :: Mix Strategy
Al Qaeda has long used a mix of strategies to achieve its objectives. To fight the United States, Al Qaeda plots terrorism spectaculars to electrify the Muslim world (and get it to follow Al Qaeda’s banner) and to convince the United States to retreat from the Muslim world: the model is based on the U.S. withdrawals from Lebanon after Hizballah bombed the Marine barracks and U.S. embassy there and the “Blackhawk Down” incident in Somalia. This beside whenever and wherever the Al-Quaeda sees that there could be a support to those within the Islamic region to take on the US, it provides basic support and the logistics to fight the US That it thinks that would be the SUCCOIUR to it’s fringe element to take on the Muslims. The Islamic State embraces some of these goals, but even where there is agreement in principle, its approach is quite different. The Islamic State’s strategy is to control territory, steadily consolidating and expanding its position.
The two groups’ the ISIS and the Al-Quaeda, lays and lies on the preferred tactics that reflect these strategic differences. Al Qaeda has long favored large-scale, dramatic attacks against strategic or symbolic targets: The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11 are the most prominent, but the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the attack on U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden in 2000, and plots like the 2005 attempt to down over 10 transatlantic flights all show an emphasis on the spectacular.
If at all the Al-Quaeda has NOT gone in for pushing themselves to Palestine it is because they would find ISRAEL a very DIFFERENT entity as compared to the US.The US still takes the HUMAN-CONSIDERATION as it’s FIRST-TIME-THOUGHTS before it plans it’s attack, and Isreal for that matter BELIEVES in TOTAL DEMOLITION of everything if it has to SAVE it’s SOVERIGNITY for anything. Unlike the US , Isreal is NOT going to let even a fraction of a second GO and LET-GO in case if anything that relates to the attack o it’s enemy is concerned.
Yet although Al Qaeda has repeatedly called for attacks against Westerners, and especially Americans, it has refrained from killing Westerners when it suited its purposes. Perhaps the most notable example of this is found in Al Qaeda’s decision on multiple occasions to grant Western journalists safe passage into Al Qaeda safe havens and allow them to interview Bin Laden face to face.
In territory it controls, the Islamic State ie , the ISIS, uses mass executions, public beheadings, rape, and symbolic crucifixion displays to terrorize the population into submission and “purify” the community, and at the same time provides basic (if minimal) services: the mix earns them some support, or at least acquiescence due to fear, from the population. Al Qaeda, in contrast, favors a more gentle approach. The Islamic State’s lesson from Iraq, somewhat incredibly, is that it was not brutal enough.
THE FIGHT FOR AFFILIATES
The Islamic State has gained support from a number of important jihadist groups. Boko Haram in Nigeria and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Egypt both formally pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and are now considered official affiliates or “provinces” of the Islamic State; as of March 2015, the Islamic State has formally recognized seven provinces, including in Libya, from whence many of its foreign fighters hail, and in Yemen, where it is now in direct competition with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Al Qaeda has historically been fairly quiet for a terrorist group when it comes to claiming and boasting of attacks, while the Islamic State often exaggerates its own prowess and role to the point of absurdity.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
For now the momentum is on the Islamic State’s side. Unlike Al Qaeda, it looks like a winner: triumphant in Iraq and Syria, taking on the Shi’a apostates and even the United States at a local level, and presenting a vision of Islamic governance that Al Qaeda cannot match. Yet this ascendance may be transitory. The Islamic State’s fate is tied to Iraq and Syria, and reverses on the battlefield—more likely now that the United States and its allies are more engaged—could over time reduce its appeal. Like its predecessor organization in Iraq, the Islamic State may also find that its brutality repels more than it attracts, diminishing its luster among potential supporters and making it vulnerable when the people suddenly turn against it.
The bad news is that the Islamic State is far more successful in achieving its goals than Al Qaeda has been: like it or not, the Islamic State really is a “state” in that it controls territory and governs it. Its military presence is roiling Iraq and Syria and the threat it poses extends to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and especially Lebanon. The Islamic State’s impressive social media efforts and overall appeal also make it better able to mobilize “lone wolves” to attack in the West. Many of these individuals will have had little or no contact with the Islamic State as an organization, but they find its ideology and methods appealing and will act on their own. Ironically, some of these individuals may have preferred to go to Iraq and Syria, but Western disruption efforts make it easier for them to attack at home.
The US has a long and a vital role to play and it has to play in a manner that in the next FOUR years from now and probably when the TRUMP administration comes to and end after another four more years, the US has to bind itself with it’s allies to completely WIND-UP and ROUND-OFF the unwanted that prevails here in this and on this earth.
The United States and its allies should try to exploit the fight between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda and, ideally, diminish them both. The infighting goes against what either organization claims to want, and it diminishes the appeal of jihad if volunteers believe they will be fighting the jihadist down the block rather than the Asad regime, Americans, Shi’a, or other enemies. Efforts to stop foreign fighters should stress this infighting. The Islamic State’s social media strategy is also a propaganda weakness: because the organization allows bottom-up efforts, it risks allowing the most foolish or horrific low-level member to define the group. Playing up its atrocities, especially against other Sunni Muslims, will steadily discredit the group.
Military efforts matter tremendously beyond the immediate theater of operations. For Al Qaeda, the constant drone campaign has diminished the core in Pakistan and made it harder for it to exercise control over the broader movement. Zawahiri himself is an important target, as he is the last major figure of the original generation of Al Qaeda with a global profile, and he will not be easily replaced. For the Islamic State, defeat on the ground will do more to diminish its appeal than any propaganda measure. The Islamic State’s self-proclaimed mission—establishing and expanding a caliphate—is also a vulnerability. If it fails at this mission by losing territory, its luster will diminish..
Because of the appeal and strength of both Al Qaeda affiliates and the Islamic State, programs to gather intelligence and develop the strength of local regimes (and at times substate groups when the regime is weak or hostile as in the case of Syria) are vital. These must be properly resourced and bureaucratically prioritized. At times U.S. personnel must be deployed in dangerous areas, taking on considerable risk.
Some degree of continued infighting between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State is the most likely outcome. As such, the United States should prepare to confront a divided adversary. The good news is that the fight within may consume most of our adversary’s attention; the bad news is that anti-U.S. violence or high-profile attacks in the Middle East may become more intense as each side seeks to outmatch its rival. Yet while spikes in violence may occur, such infighting will undermine their ability to shape regional politics, diminish both movements’ overall influence, and ultimately discredit jihadism in general.
Al-Queda and ISIS : Different Ideologies and different target
Finally- before I wind up I would once again like to MAKE a " FIRM " difference between the Al-Quaeda and the ISIS Group.I would like to say in FIRST that both these groups are ILL-HUMAN and a BAD entity to the world at large and are infact a DEATH for the human beings.They are only targeting with some resonating ideas that does not matches to the likings of the WORLD.
Al-Qaeda ideologues envision the removal of all foreign influences in Muslim countries. Al-Qaeda members believe that a Christian–Jewish alliance is conspiring to destroy Islam. As Salafist jihadists, members of al-Qaeda believe that the killing of non-combatants is religiously sanctioned.
It is broad-based militant Islamist organization founded by Osama Bin laden in the late 1980s.
Al-Qaeda began as a logistical network to support Muslims fighting against the Soviet Union during the Afghan War; members were recruited throughout the Islamic world. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the organization dispersed but continued to oppose what its leaders considered corrupt Islamic regimes and foreign (i.e., U.S.) presence in Islamic lands. Based in Sudan for a period in the early 1990s, the group eventually reestablished its headquarters in Afghanistan (c. 1996) under the patronage of the Taliban militia.
Al-Qaeda merged with a number of other militant Islamist organizations, including Egypt’s Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group, and on several occasions its leaders declared holy war against the United States. The organization established camps for Muslim militants from throughout the world, training tens of thousands in paramilitary skills, and its agents engaged in numerous terrorist attacks, including the destruction of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (1998), and a suicide bomb attack against the U.S. warship Cole in Aden, Yemen (2000; see USS Cole attack). In 2001, 19 militants associated with al-Qaeda staged the September 11 attacks against the United States. Within weeks the U.S. government responded by attacking Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. Thousands of militants were killed or captured, among them several key members (including the militant who allegedly planned and organized the September 11 attacks), and the remainder and their leaders were driven into hiding.
Comparing Al Qaeda
and ISIS: Different goals, different targets
The Islamic State does not follow Al
Qaeda’s “far enemy” strategy, preferring instead the “near enemy” strategy,
albeit on a regional level. As such, the primary target of the Islamic State
has not been the United States, but rather “apostate” regimes in the Arab
world—namely, the Asad regime in Syria and the Abadi regime in Iraq. Like his
predecessors, Baghdadi favors purifying the Islamic community first by
attacking Shi’a and other religious minorities as well as rival jihadist
groups. The Islamic State’s long list of enemies includes the Iraqi Shi’a, the
Lebanese Hizballah, the Yazidis (a Kurdish ethno-religious minority located
predominantly in Iraq), and rival opposition groups in Syria (including Jabhat
al-Nusra, the official Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria).Ostensibly in response to intervention by the United States and others in the conflict, Western civilians in the region (including journalists and humanitarian aid workers) have also become targets—though the Islamic State saw them as hostile before the U.S. intervention. And now that American military advisers are on the ground in Iraq supporting the Iraqi military, the U.S. military has ostensibly become a primary target Rgds
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