Abrogation Of
" SHIMLA AGREEMENT - 1972 " -
Bangladesh and " LoC " Now
Does not "EXIST "
This article and the subject matter
has become a bit old, as it is out of the date for the moment but this actually
ought to be scripted as the OPERATION
SINDOOR infact has opened many a questions and has raised many an
eyebrows.
The most important fact was that the
SHIMLA AGREEMENT came into
the question as prominence and this article has much to do with the agreement
of Shimla that took place in 1972under the Premiership of Mrs Gandhi, the Ex-
Prime Minister .
This brought into question about
Bangladesh and its border beside it being a country worth considering it an
independent nation at all, because the Shimla agreement actually has been
responsible for India to consider Bangaldesh a nation by all means.
1. It was out of the context that Bangladesh was created :: CATACLYSMIC PARTITION
The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 was one of the most unexpected events in South Asian history. The subcontinent had already endured the cataclysmic Partition of 1947, which left deep wounds in its political and social fabric. For nearly twenty-five years, Pakistan existed in a bifurcated form—West Pakistan and East Pakistan—separated by over a thousand miles of Indian territory. Yet, few could have truly foreseen that this tenuous arrangement would collapse so decisively and lead to the birth of an entirely new nation.
At the heart of this “ out of the context ” creation lies the reality that Bangladesh was not the product of long, deliberate international negotiations or the outcome of gradual constitutional evolution. Instead, it was the sudden eruption of discontent, repression, and eventual armed conflict that carved it into being. Unlike many postcolonial states that came into being after protracted struggles and carefully negotiated treaties, Bangladesh was born of war, humanitarian tragedy, and the shifting alignments of global power politics.
For India, the creation of Bangladesh was initially an unforeseen trajectory. India had supported the liberation movement morally and politically, but the eventual crystallization of an independent state so quickly after the 1971 war was not a development envisioned at the war’s outset. The sheer magnitude of refugee inflows, the brutality unleashed upon East Pakistan by its western wing, and the sudden collapse of Pakistani defenses made the transformation from “ rebellious province ” to “ independent state ” both dramatic and inevitable.
Finally, it must be noted that the creation of Bangladesh did not simply redraw the map; it redefined the very logic of post-Partition South Asia. For nearly twenty-five years, Pakistan’s claim to be the homeland for South Asia’s Muslims stood as an ideological cornerstone. The secession of Bangladesh shattered this ideological foundation, showing that linguistic, cultural, and regional identities could be stronger than religious nationalism.
When the guns fell silent on December 17, 1971, South Asia found itself staring at a reality that had taken shape faster than even the most astute strategists had anticipated. The capitulation of Pakistan’s Eastern Command to India and the Mukti Bahini was not merely a military surrender; it was the crumbling of a political experiment that lasted less than a quarter of a century. Yet, as remarkable as it may seem, the idea of a fully sovereign Bangladesh had not been articulated in concrete terms at the start of the conflict.
It must be remembered that in the early stages of the crisis, even Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his leadership circle envisioned autonomy rather than outright secession. The Six-Point Program sought meaningful self-rule, not necessarily a separate flag for the region. However, the brutality of West Pakistan’s response—the military crackdown, widespread atrocities, and systematic suppression of Bengali identity—transformed what had once been a demand for federalism into an irrepressible tide for independence.
For India, too, the notion of a wholly independent Bangladesh was not its initial aim. Strategic planners in New Delhi viewed the crisis primarily through the lens of refugee flows and regional security. However, with each passing week, the inevitability of secession became clearer, until finally, military victory crystallized the political birth of a nation.
Thus, the division of Pakistan into two states was not the fruit of an original, carefully nurtured design but the culmination of circumstances spiraling beyond control. The 1971 war became the crucible in which vague yearnings for autonomy were forged into the hardened steel of independence.
3. It was their American Seventh Fleet sent by the
Presidentship of Mr. Richard Nixon to the Indian Ocean, and seemingly an attack
on India, that brought the recognition of Bangladesh into the forefront
The 7th FLEET Entry Into The Indian Ocean :: A Dramatic
Episode
Ironically, instead of intimidating India, the American show of force highlighted the urgency of bringing the Bangladesh issue to the forefront of international recognition. Far from isolating India, it underscored the legitimacy of India’s cause in the eyes of the Soviet Union, which had already extended a protective umbrella through the Indo–Soviet Treaty of Friendship signed earlier in 1971. By threatening India at the moment of its military triumph, the United States inadvertently hardened its resolve to consolidate Bangladesh’s recognition, lest its fragile independence be compromised by great-power maneuvering.
Therefore, the recognition of Bangladesh did not emerge solely from the battlefield victory but also from the theater of global politics. The Seventh Fleet’s entry into the Indian Ocean magnified the stakes, turning what could have remained a regional settlement into a symbol of postcolonial assertion against superpower intimidation in the Indian Ocean.
Thus, paradoxically, an act intended to weaken India ended up strengthening it. The American naval move revealed the fragility of Pakistan’s position and the desperation of its allies. Ultimately, it catalyzed the process by which Bangladesh moved from being a battlefield reality to a recognized sovereign state.
In the early months of 1971, as the crisis in East Pakistan spiraled, there were whispers in policy circles that an independent Bangladesh might not emerge as a fully sovereign entity but rather as a quasi-federal arrangement under India’s overarching influence. The enormous costs of war, the refugee crisis, and the strategic vulnerabilities of the subcontinent led some in New Delhi to toy with the idea of establishing a protectorate-like arrangement—a union of sorts which ere Bangladesh would remain politically distinct but strategically tethered to India.
However, the intervention of the American Seventh Fleet transformed this calculus. By injecting Cold War rivalries directly into the Bay of Bengal, the United States forced India to abandon any halfway solutions. A Bangladesh that is seen as too dependent on India might invite further great-power contests, making it vulnerable to manipulation by external forces. To withstand this pressure, India had to support an unequivocally sovereign Bangladesh—one that would stand as a buffer and partner rather than a dependent appendage.
Moreover, the spirit of the liberation struggle was incompatible with the idea of subordination. The Mukti Bahini, having fought and bled for independence, could not have accepted a future as anything less than masters of their destiny. The liberation movement’s moral and political momentum was toward self-rule, not incorporation.
Thus, the Seventh Fleet’s intrusion merely hastened the crystallization of this logic, ensuring that Bangladesh was recognized as a full-fledged nation rather than an Indian-administered union.
In the early months of 1971, as the crisis in East Pakistan spiraled, there were whispers in policy circles that an independent Bangladesh might not emerge as a fully sovereign entity but rather as a quasi-federal arrangement under India’s overarching influence. The enormous costs of war, the refugee crisis, and the strategic vulnerabilities of the subcontinent led some in New Delhi to toy with the idea of establishing a protectorate-like arrangement—a union of sorts which ere Bangladesh would remain politically distinct but strategically tethered to India.
However, the intervention of the American Seventh Fleet transformed this calculus. By injecting Cold War rivalries directly into the Bay of Bengal, the United States forced India to abandon any halfway solutions. A Bangladesh that is seen as too dependent on India might invite further great-power contests, making it vulnerable to manipulation by external forces. To withstand this pressure, India had to support an unequivocally sovereign Bangladesh—one that would stand as a buffer and partner rather than a dependent appendage.
Moreover, the spirit of the liberation struggle was incompatible with the idea of subordination. The Mukti Bahini, having fought and bled for independence, could not have accepted a future as anything less than masters of their destiny. The liberation movement’s moral and political momentum was toward self-rule, not incorporation.
Thus, the Seventh Fleet’s intrusion merely hastened the crystallization of this logic, ensuring that Bangladesh was recognized as a full-fledged nation rather than an Indian-administered union.
5. Bangladesh was recognized by India and thereafter many
countries recognized it
India’s recognition was the decisive diplomatic step that transformed the
liberation of East Pakistan into the sovereign identity of Bangladesh. India’s
recognition came not merely as an expression of solidarity but as a formal
declaration to the world that Bangladesh was here to stay. Within days, dozens
of other nations followed suit, and the tide of legitimacy gathered an
unstoppable momentum.
Recognition was not simply a matter of protocol; it was a political act of tremendous consequence. By recognizing Bangladesh, India signaled to Pakistan that the old order could not be resurrected, and to the international community that this was no longer a secessionist movement but a new member of the global family of nations. The voice of the Mukti Bahini, once dismissed as rebellious, now acquired the authority of the government.
It is also important to note that India’s recognition emboldened many smaller nations to act without fear of being punished. What was once a hesitant whisper became a chorus of affirmation. Thus, the act of recognition marked the moment when Bangladesh stepped beyond the battlefield and into the realm of international diplomacy.
Thus, what began as an internal struggle within Pakistan became an irreversible transformation of the architecture of South Asia. Recognition sealed Bangladesh’s place on the map and erased any lingering doubts about its right to exist.
6. The Shimla Agreement was later done at Shimla … covering
Bangladesh and its border with India
BATTLEFIELD TRANSFORMED INTO
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF DIPLOMACY
Although most often remembered for its provisions concerning Kashmir and the LoC, the Shimla Agreement also indirectly covered the new reality of Bangladesh. By accepting the terms of the accord, Pakistan implicitly acknowledged the permanence of Bangladesh’s independence, albeit without immediate formal recognition. This was a reluctant but crucial concession for the United States.
The agreement also established that matters arising from the Bangladesh crisis—borders, refugees, and security—would be settled bilaterally between India and Bangladesh without Pakistani interference. In this sense, the accord not only stabilized India–Pakistan relations but also legitimized the Indo–Bangladesh partnership that followed.
Thus, the Shimla Agreement was more than just a treaty between India and Pakistan. It was a tacit acknowledgment of a new regional order in which Bangladesh had secured its rightful place.
In the aftermath of the war, Pakistan was compelled to accept that Bangladesh had been irretrievably lost. While the Shimla Agreement did not use the blunt language of formal recognition, it carried the weight of acknowledgment. By agreeing to settle disputes with India bilaterally, Pakistan effectively renounced any future claims over Bangladesh.
This marked a turning point in the diplomacy of South Asia. For decades, Pakistan sought to impose its authority on East Bengal, but Shimla represented the formal burial of that dream. This agreement created space for Bangladesh to grow without the looming shadow of Pakistani interference.
For India, Shimla vindicated its sacrifices. It secured the assurance that Pakistan would not attempt to reopen the wounds of 1971 by meddling in Bangladesh’s affairs after the war. The subcontinent could, at last, hope for a measure of stability, however fragile it may be.
Thus, the Shimla Agreement was more than a truce; it was an acknowledgment of a new nation’s birth and the drawing of new historical lines.
8. Matters relating to Bangladesh would be resolved between
India and Bangladesh, without Pakistan’s intervention
EXPLICIT DELETION AND EXCLUSION OF
THE SHIMLE AGREEMENT -
This arrangement was both practical and symbolic in nature. Practically, it recognized the futility of involving Pakistan in questions over land it no longer controlled. Symbolically, it enshrined the principle that Bangladesh was a fully sovereign state capable of engaging in its own diplomacy without Pakistani oversight.
This was critical for Bangladesh. It gave the young nation the confidence to engage directly with its largest neighbor, free from the shadow of its former rulers. For India, it reinforced the legitimacy of Bangladesh’s sovereignty and ensured that Pakistan could not use its old claims to complicate the future.
Thus, the Shimla framework did not merely end a war; it defined the channels through which peace could be achieved. It placed Bangladesh firmly within the family of nations, shielding it from the encumbrances of its past.
9. If at all Pakistan forbids to agree upon the Shimla Agreement
… it would be construed that the agreement does not exist at all
The Shimla Agreement was, at its heart, a pact of mutual trust—fragile yet
binding. If Pakistan were to repudiate it, the entire edifice of post-1971
diplomacy would collapse. By denying the agreement, Pakistan would, in effect,
deny the legitimacy of its concessions.
Such a denial would unravel not only the settlement over Bangladesh but also the delicate arrangements regarding Kashmir’s future. Shimla was a package deal: an understanding that all disputes would be settled bilaterally within the new political geography of South Asia. To reject it would be to turn back the clock to the chaos of pre-1971 Bangladesh.
The paradox is stark: if Pakistan refuses Shimla, it nullifies the very framework that allowed it to salvage some dignity after its defeat. In doing so, it would erase the recognition of boundaries, agreements, and even its own acknowledgment of Bangladesh.
Thus, the denial of Shimla is not merely a diplomatic quibble; it is an invitation to historical amnesia.
10. During Operation Sindoora, Pakistan started screaming that
the Shimla Agreement does not stand good anymore
Events in later years, such as Pakistan’s declarations during and after Operation Sindoora, illustrate the volatility of its position. By proclaiming that the Shimla Agreement no longer held,and that it does not holds any good, or any importance for Pakistan , Pakistan attempted to reopen old wounds and challenge the order it had once signed.
However, such claims reveal more about Pakistan’s insecurity than the validity of the accord. International law agreements do not evaporate merely because one party shouts them away. Shimla’s essence lay in the mutual recognition of new realities; denying it only underscored Pakistan’s inability to reconcile with the history of Kashmir.
For India and Bangladesh, these proclamations were reminders of the fragility of their peace. They highlighted the need for constant vigilance, lest their old ambitions undermine the stability of the subcontinent.
Thus, Pakistan’s rejectionist rhetoric was less a legal position than a cry of frustration—a refusal to accept that the world had moved on.
11. If that is so—Bangladesh and its boundaries and the border
it shares with India does not stand at all
DOES PAKISTAN QUESTIONS THE
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BANGLADESH -
This stance is inherently self-defeating. To deny the legitimacy of Bangladesh’s borders is to deny the geography of modern South Asia. This would plunge the region into chaos and unravel decades of diplomacy and stability.
However, India and Bangladesh have chosen to strengthen their bilateral ties to inoculate themselves against such denialism. By deepening cooperation, they have reinforced the permanence of their shared border, regardless of Pakistan’s rhetoric on Kashmir.
Thus, while Pakistan may seek to challenge boundaries in words, the realities on the ground stand firm, etched in history and geography.
12. If for Pakistan the Shimla Agreement does not mean anything,
then the issue of Kashmir too does not stand at all
NO SHIMLA AGREEMENT , NO ISSUES OF
KASHMIR AT ALL - ::
Without Shimla, Pakistan loses the framework through which it has continued to press its claims. It would be left with no legitimate basis to demand dialogue, as the agreement that enshrined bilateralism would no longer exist. In such a scenario, India could argue that Pakistan has forfeited its role in the discussion.
Thus, in attempting to repudiate Shimla, Pakistan undermines its own central argument. The logic is inescapable: to deny Shimla is to deny Kashmir.
13. Let Pakistan agree to these nuances … if it does not believe
in Shimla, then neither Bangladesh nor Kashmir exist at all for Pakistan
The ultimate paradox of Pakistan’s rejectionist stance is this:
by disowning the Shimla Agreement, it disowns the very realities upon which its
foreign policy rests. Without Shimla, there is no recognition of Bangladesh,
and without Shimla, there is no framework for Kashmir.
Therefore, for Pakistan to deny Shimla is to embrace incoherence. It would be
left with neither moral grounds nor diplomatic leverage. The denial of history
cannot alter geography; it can only isolate a nation from the passage of time.
In contrast, India and Bangladesh have built on Shimla to deepen their ties and
to stabilize their borders. They have accepted the past and moved on to the
future. Pakistan, by clinging to denial, risks being trapped in a perpetual
loop of grievance.
Thus, the resolution of South Asia’s “burning issues” lies not in denial but in
acceptance. Shimla remains the cornerstone of peace, and its rejection only
reveals the futility of trying to erase what history has already written.
That is it
That Is It and that speaks all about it
Mr Shyamal Bhattacharjee, the author was born at West Chirimiri Colliery at District Surguja, Chattisgarh on July 6th 1959 He received his early education at Carmel Convent School Bishrampur and later at Christ Church Boys' Higher Secondary School at Jabalpur. He later joined Hislop College at Nagpur and completed his graduation in Science and he also added a degree in B A thereafter. He joined the HITAVADA, a leading dailies of Central India at Nagpur as a Sub-Editor ( Sports ) but gave up to complete his MBA in 1984 He thereafter added a Diploma In Export Management. He has authored SEVEN books namely Notable Quotes and Noble Thought published by Pustak Mahal in 2001 Indian Cricket : Faces That Changed It published by Manas Publications in 2009 and Essential Of Office Management published by NBCA, Kolkatta in 2012, GOLDEN QUOTES on INSPIRATION , SORROW , PEACE and LIFE published by B.F.C Publications, Lucknow, , and QUOTES:: Evolution and Origin of Management Electives by Clever Fox Publishing, Chennai ,From Dhyan To Dhan :: Indian Hockey - Sudden Death Or Extra Time published by BOOKS CLINIC Publishing House , Bilaspur , Chattisgarh and his FIRST book on Hindi poem, which reads as " BHED HAI GEHRA - BAAT JARA SI " and MIDAS TOUCH AND MIRACLES OF INDIAN SPORTS , published by Books Clinics , Bilaspur , Chhattisgarh,
He has a experience of about 35 years in Marketing , and Business Analytics .
Comments
Post a Comment